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Juson and Lillington: R. v. Butler

R. v. BUTLER: RECOGNIZING THE
EXPRESSIVE VALUE AND THE
HARM IN PORNOGRAPHY
The subject matter of the material under review ... is sexual activity. Such activity is part
of the human experience . . . . The depiction of
such activity has the potential of titillating some
and of informing others. How can images which
have such effect be meaningless?l

I. INTRODUCTION

American courts have traditionally regulated pornography
when it falls within the United States Supreme Court's definition of obscenity.2 Pornography3 falls within this definition when
courts find the sexual explicitness in pornographic material offensive and corrupting to the moral fiber of the community.· Another view has developed, however, which recognizes that pornography inflicts harm on society through its debasing
1. R. v. Butler, 1 W.W.R. 97 (Man. 1990) (Twaddle, J., dissenting), cited with approval in R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 487 (Can.).
2. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The definition of obscenity as the
authors of this comment will use it is set forth in Miller. The Miller definition deems
pornographic material obscene when the average person, applying contemporary standards, finds that the material as a whole appeals to the prurient interest, is patently
offensive, and lacks any serious literary or artistic value. See discussion infra notes 24-25
and accompanying text.
3. The authors of this comment are conscious that the term "pornography" is elusive and takes on different meanings depending on who is using it. See infra notes 33-36
and accompanying text for discussion of the anti-pornography feminists' view that pornography is a civil rights violation. See also infra part ILA for a discussion of the current
Supreme Court's view of pornography. "Pornography" as used in this comment, means
graphic depictions of sex between individuals conveyed through the medium of videos,
films, books, or magazines. Pornography's function is to sexually arouse its viewers. The
authors purposely give the term a neutral meaning, and except where specific adjectives
such as "violent" or "degrading" are added in the text, the reader should take this term
as it has been defined here.
4. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 908-17 (2d
ed. 1988) (discussing the roots of the Miller test).
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depictions of women and children. a
The recent Canadian Supreme Court decision of R. v. Butler6 recognizes and addresses the harmful anti-social attitudes
and behaviors towards women which are perpetuated by misogynistic, violent pornography.7 Meanwhile, American courts continue to grapple with their traditional obscenity standard. s
This comment presents an overview of the American approach to regulating and categorizing pornography, and explores
the obstacles this approach creates for addressing the issues of
harm to women. The pivotal elements of the Butler court's analysis will be discussed in light of American decisions. The authors
propose that a But ler analysis offers a more honest and balanced
approach to the pornography issue, and that such an approach
would be feasible within the parameters of the First Amendment
in the United States.
II. THE AMERICAN APPROACH
The controversy surrounding pornography stems from the
clash between the First Amendment9 and forms of pornographic
expression which denigrate large sections of society, yet do not
fall within the American obscenity definition. to The obscenity
definition categorizes explicit depictions of sex "obscene" when
they are deviant from, and offensive to, societal mores. l l Porno5. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 197
(1989) (discussing abuse and sex discrimination caused by debasing pornographic depictions). See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (recognizing that child pornography causes serious physical and emotional harm to children).
6. (1992) 1 S.C.R. at 452 (Can.) (creating a new definition for obscene materials and
pornography based on harm).
7. [d. at 510-11.
8. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (setting forth the guidelines for determining whether
pornographic materials are obscene).
9. The relevant language of the first amendment is: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . . " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. For a selection of varying perspectives surrounding the pornography debate, see
generally ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589 (1986); Martin Karo
and Marcia McBrian, The Lessons of Miller and Hudnut: On Proposing A Pornography
Ordinance That Passes Constitutional Muster, 23 J. OF L. REF. 179, 184 (1989); Thomas
I. Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKinnon,
3 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 130 (1984).
11. See MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 199. Professor MacKinnon stresses that ob-
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graphic material falls within this obscenity definition when a
court deems its sexual explicitness "patently offensive. "12
In determining whether a restriction on speech can be justified, the Supreme Court requires courts to balance the value of
speech against other compelling interests. 13 With obscenity, the
Court deems preserving the morals of society a compelling interest which outweighs the minimal expressive value in certain sexually explicit materials. 14 The rationale behind the Court's treatment of obscenity as minimally expressive, however, has never
been clearly articulated. U
scenity is more concerned with whether men blush than with the harm it causes to
women. The American definition of obscenity stems from what is seen as sexual impurity: "[T)he modern rule is that obscenity is measured by the erotic allurement upon the
average modern reader; that the erotic allurement of a book is measured by whether it is
sexually impure - i.e., pornographic, 'dirt for dirt's sake,' a calculated incitement to
sexual desire . . . . " WALTER KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM 199 (quoting Roth v.
Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 790 (2d Cir. 1948». One of the major problems with the obscen·
ity definition is its failure to provide a clear workable set of guidelines for clarifying what
materials fall within the "obscene" category. The famous utterance of Justice Stewart, "I
know it when I see it," Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964), testifies to this. See
also KENDRICK at 194-200 for different definitions of obscenity in the U.S., which generally target the "lewd offensiveness" of sexually explicit material. Several definitions
make a distinction between normal and deviant sexual desires.
12. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 19.
13. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1985)
(finding that first amendment concerns outweighed any articulated interest of a proposed anti·pornography ordinance). C{. Kathleen Mahoney, Canadian Constitutional
Approach To Freedom of Expression in Hate Propaganda and Pornography, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1992) (discussing the Canadian Charter, which, unlike the United
States Constitution, expressly requires a balancing of freedom of speech against equality
concerns).
14. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2457 (1991); Hudnut, 771 F.2d
at 331 (finding that pornography which does not fall within the obscenity definition is
expression and thus merits first amendment protection); TRIBE, supra note 4, § 12·16;
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 602-04 (discussing speech regulation on the basis of the
speech's value and the harm it produces).
15. It is unclear why the United States has placed obscenity outside first amendment protection. The Court in Miller assumed that obscenity was unprotected speech:
"This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unpro·
tected by the first amendment." Miller, 413 U.S. at 23. See also Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484·85 (1951) (relying on tradition and the historical treatment of obscene
ity as a rationale for placing it outside the protection of the first amendment); TRIBE,
supra note 4, § 12-16. (discussing some of the reasons offered by courts for why obscenity
could justify suppression of speech); Louis Henkin, Morals and The Constitution: The
Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 391-92 (1963) (discussing the fact that obscenity laws are motivated by traditional notions of religion and morals).
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PORNOGRAPHY AS UNPROTECTED EXPRESSION

In United States v. Roth,16 the Court upheld a conviction
under a federal statute prohibiting the mailing of "obscene,
lewd, lascivious or filthy" materials. 17 The Court ruled the material "obscene" and thus outside First Amendment protection
since it was "utterly without socially redeeming value."18 The
Court distinguished between material which expresses ideas, no
matter how controversial or unpopular, and obscenity, which, according to the Court, merely arouses the senses. 19
Twenty-two years later, in Miller v. California,20 the Supreme Court rejected the constitutional standard set forth in
Roth. 21 While agreeing with Roth's holding that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment,22 the Court set
forth a new American obscenity standard. 23 The Miller test focuses on whether an average person, applying contemporary
standards, would find that the subject as a whole: a) appeals to a
prurient24 interest, b) depicts or describes in a patently offensive
way sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law,
and c) lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
16. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (upholding a federal statute prohibiting mailing of obscene
materials).
17. [d. at 491.
18. [d. at 484. See also JoEllen Lane, Note, Osborne v. Ohio, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 427,
428-30 (1991) (discussing the Roth decision).
19. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (discussing the function that pornography serves).
20. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (upholding a California criminal obscenity statute which prohibited thrusting aggressive sales of obscene materials upon unwilling recipients).
21. [d. at 22-23.
22. The key to the Roth decision and the later Miller holding was the Court's rejection of the claim that obscene materials were protected by the First Amendment:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the full
protection of the [First Amendment] guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance ....
Roth, 354 U.S. at 484, cited with approval in Miller, 413 U.S. at 20.
23. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
24. "Prurient," as defined by the Miller Court, means "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor .... " [d. at 17 n.1.
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value. 211 The Miller test is narrowly construed to comport with
First Amendment concerns. 26
The Miller Court held that obscene speech embodies none
of the traditional political and ideological values which the First
Amendment was primarily designed to protect: 27
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and
the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace. It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. 28
25. [d. at 25. The underlying concern of the Miller Court was that courts remain
sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
expression.
26. [d. at 23-24 (discussing the dangers of regulating any form of expression with
respect to the first amendment). The Court in Miller required that sexual acts be depicted in a patently offensive way. This includes sexual acts which are actual or simulated. In theory this can include medium-core or soft-core pornography. The reality of
the Miller test, however, is that the standard set is so rigorous that pornography flourishes in violation of existing laws. See Bruce A. Taylor, Hard Core Pornography: A Proposal for a Per Se Rule, 21 J. OF L. REF. 255, 275-76 (1988). See generally 1 A'ITORNEY
GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FINAL REPORT 367 (1986)
[hereinafter COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY].
27. Miller, 413 U.S. at 34. In answering the dissenting justices' concern about the
suppression of speech, the majority in Miller held that, "to equate the free and robust
exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material
demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the
historic struggle for freedom." [d. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 70 (1976):
[Ilt is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than
the interest in untrammelled political debate . . . . Whether
political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every school child can understand why our duty to defend the right t~ speak remains the
same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off
to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual
Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice.
28. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
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This "expression versus non-expression" dichotomy stems
from the traditional moral perspective the United States has
adopted towards explicit sex: 29 "[I]t [has been] common to dismiss the case against pornography as the product of prudishness
or inhibition, a kind of aesthetic distaste not grounded in concrete showings of harm. Regulation of sexually explicit material
has thus been based on its offensiveness."3o
In Miller, the Court held that states had a legitimate interest in avoiding "the significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles."31 The
justification for regulating obscenity was to maintain the moral
decency of the community.32
The moral foundation of the American obscenity doctrine
has been vigorously attacked in recent years by anti-pornography feminists and theorists. 33 According to anti-pornography
feminists, a gender-neutral view of what is "patently offensive"
turns obscenity into a question of what the patriarchial majority
at any given time sees as good taste. 34
29. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2457 (holding that state's police power to provide for
the public health, safety and morals justified regulation of public nudity and nude dancing); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (holding that states have the
power to make a "morally neutral judgment" to maintain a decent society); Henkin,
supra note 15, at 393 (discussing the country's religious antecelients of governmental
responsibility for communal and individual decency and morality); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 291, 322 ("Obscenity law is concerned
with morality, specifically morals from the male point of view .... ").
30. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 594.
31. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18.
32. TRIBE, supra note 4, § 12-16. See also MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 329 (asserting that the Supreme Court's view of obscenity is that, "Obscenity at bottom is not a
crime. Obscenity is a sin.").
33. For a comprehensive examination of the feminist movement against pornography starting in 1970, focusing on MacKinnon and Dworkin's accomplishments in the
anti-pornography struggle, see generally Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis,39
L. REV. 607 (1987).
34. See MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 331-32:

STAN.

The outcome, descriptively analyzed, is that obscenity law
prohibits what it sees as immoral, which from a feminist
standpoint tends to be relatively harmless, while protecting
what it sees as moral, which from a feminist standpoint is
often that which is damaging to women .... What male morality finds evil, meaning threatening to its power, feminist
politics tends to find comparatively harmless. What feminist
politics identifies as central in our subordination - i.e. the
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The obscenity label created by the Supreme Court fails to
consider the reality of pornographic material which falls within
the obscenity definition. 311 The American obscenity doctrine's
rigid framework ignores pornography's capacity to communicate
ideas. 38
Pornography is more than "dirt for dirt's sake;"37 it is a
form of expression which conveys ideas and attitudes through its
depictions of sex.38 What are depictions of sex if they are not
expression?39 Books, magazines, and movies, by their very nature, are forms of expression. 40 Pornography can express the celebration of consensual and liberating sexuality.41 Pornography
can also dehumanize and objectify its participants, resulting in
deleterious effects on behavior and attitudes. 42
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized the avoidance of certain societal harms as justifying reguerotization of dominance and submission - male morality will
tend to find comparatively harmless or defend as affirmatively
valuable, hence protected speech.
35. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1985) (discussing how the United States courts ignore the
complex issues surrounding pornography and the insidious effects pornography has on
societal beliefs).
36. See Karo & McBrian, supra note 10, at 183 ("The Court assumed a dichotomy
between material that presented ideas, no matter how controversial or hateful, and material intended purely to titillate or excite. ").
37. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 492.
38. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 (recognizing the power of pornography as speech).
39. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that
sexual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community, welfare, and the development of human personality." The fact that individuals
define themselves in a significant way through their intimate
sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours ... that much of the richness of a relationship
will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the
form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.
[d. at 205 (citations omitted).
40. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 488.
41. [d. at 500 (discussing "good" pornography which validates women's will to pleasure). See generally LONNIE BARBACH, PLEASURES: WOMEN WRITE EROTICA (1984).
42. See HARRY CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: CENSORSHIP IN A LIBERAL
SOCIETY 242 (1969). The author defines pornography as "a certain kind of obscenity - it
is sexual obscenity in which the debasement of the human element is heavily accentuated, is depicted in great physiological detail, and is carried very far toward its utmost
logical conclusion." [d.
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lation of speech;u The Court has not, however, considered de-.
basing depictions of women such a harm.44 With obscenity, the
Court considers offensiveness the "harm" which justifies placing
obscene speech outside First Amendment protection. 411 This
leads to an inconsistent and unworkable approach which offers
few guidelines for courts on the complex issue of pornography.

B.

INCONSISTENCIES
DEFINITION

1.

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 4s

OF

THE

AMERICAN

NON-ExPRESSION

In order to deal with the distinction between expression and
non-expression, the Supreme Court has stretched far to circumvent the Miller test in order to allow states to regulate pornography. To prohibit pornographic expression, the Court must either
label explicit material as obscene speech and thus unprotected,'7
or deem the sexual activity "conduct" and therefore regulable
because conduct is not speech and therefore any impact on the
First Amendment is "incidental. "48 The Supreme Court took the
latter approach in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., upholding a
public indecency statute used to ban nude dancing. 49 .
The Barnes Court upheld an Indiana public nudity statute
which targeted nude dancers and required them to wear pasties
and G-Strings. llo The Court held the statute constitutional because it had "other purposes" than proscribing free speech. III
43. Other examples of restrictions on free speech to avoid harm which the United
States has recognized include FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (overhearing
of indecent speech by children); Miller, 413 U.S. at 19 (exposing juveniles and unconsenting adults to obscene material); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (harm
due to a racist leaflet containing group libel); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 568 (harm by
speech coupled with the risk of imminent breach of the peace).
44. See MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 322. See generally COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY,
supra note 26 (finding no direct link between harm to women and pornography).
45. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 594 (discussing the regulation of sexually explicit
material on the basis of offensiveness rather than harm).
46. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (upholding an Indiana public indecency statute as applied
to nude dancing).
47. See discussion supra part II.A; Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
48. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2456.
49. [d.
50. [d. at 2459.
51. [d. at 2463. The Court found that the pur'pose of the statute, although not articulated in the statute, was to preserve societal order and morality, not to restrict free
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Since the intent of the statute was not to regulate speech, but
simply to regulate the offensive conduct of public nudity for
purposes of societal order and morality, the Court found any
First Amendment infringements incidental. Ci2
The Barnes Court acknowledged the expressive value of
erotic dancing. Ci3 However, the Court held thatthe nudity aspect
of the dance was mere conduct which was on "the outer perimeters" of the First Amendment. Ci4 The Court concluded that nude
erotic dancing was entitled to only a small degree of First
Amendment protection. CiCi
The majority's separation of "non-expressive nudity" from
the "expression of dancing" was strongly criticized in Justice
White's dissent. Ci6 Justice White noted that the nudity itself was
an expressive component of the erotic dancing and not simply
conduct: Ci7
It is only because nude dancing performances
may generate emotions and feelings of eroticism
and sensuality among the spectators that the
State seeks to regulate such expressive activity,
apparently on the assumption that creating or
emphasizing such thoughts and ideas in the
minds of the spectators may lead to increased
prostitution and the degradation of women. G8

A person's nudity cannot be independent from the accompanying actions of the body which convey a message. The majorspeech.Id. The Court stated that this purpose was unrelated to the suppression of freedom of expression and therefore legitimate. Id. at 2462.
52. Id. at 2456.
53.Id.
54. Id. at 2459 (Souter, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Souter stated
that "the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, since the pernicious
effects are merely associated with nude dancing establishments and are not the result of
the expression inherent in nude dancing." Id ..
55. See Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives In Search of The First Amendment: The
Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 611, 651 (1992) (discussing
Justice Souter's concession that nudity by itself can be expressive).
56. Justice White criticized the. majority opinion, stating that "[tJhe nudity element
of nude dancing performances cannot be neatly pigeonholed as mere 'conduct' independent of any expressive component of the dance." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2474 (White, J.,
dissenting).
57.Id.
58.Id.
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ity's treatment of "nudity" as· independent from the very act of
dancing highlights the contrived nature of the American obscenity doctrine, which treats all obscene material as non-expression.
2.

American Booksellers Ass'n.v. Hudnut 5S

In American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck down an Indianapolis statute which prohibited subordinating depictions of women in pornography as a form of sex discrimination. 6o Catharine
MacKinnon, an anti-pornography feminist and a drafter of the
ordinance, defines pornography as a civil rights violation. 61 According to MacKinnon, pornography, as an expression of male
domination and women's servility, institutionalizes inequality
and male supremacy.62 MacKinnon faults the court for treating
pornography as simple depictions of sex while ignoring the fact
that pornography perpetuates the objectification of women
through such depictions. 63
59. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking down an Indianapolis ordinance as content-based regulation).
60. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324. The ordinance described pornography as, "the graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words." [d. The ordinance also described pornography as depicting one or more of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or
humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience
sexual pleasure in being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or
mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or
truncated or fragmented or severed into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or
animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury,
abasement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding,
bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual; or
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination,
conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through
postures or positions of servility or submission or display.
INDIANAPOLIS. IND .. CITy-COUNTY GENERAL ORDINANCE ch. 16 § 16-3(q) (1984). See also
MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 26 (defending her position on the ordinance).
61. MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 18: "What pornography does goes beyond its content: it eroticizes hierarchy, it sexualizes inequality. It makes dominance and submission
sex. Inequality is its central dynamic .... "
62. [d.
63. MacKinnon argues that pornography portrays heinous abuses of women, "[o)nly
in the pornography it is called something else: sex, sex, sex, sex, and sex, respectively.
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A striking failure of the Indianapolis ordinance was its refusal to incorporate any of the safeguards encompassed in the
Miller formulation of obscenity, such as the artistic defense. 64
The Hudnut court criticized the ordinance for not providing an
artistic defense. 61i Unlike the Miller test's concern for artistic,
political, or scientific expression,66 the Indianapolis ordinance
did not accomodate the view that harmful pornography could
have socially redeeming value. 67
In striking down the ordinance, the Hudnut court acknowleged that pornographic material expresses ideas. 6s The court
emphasized that such ideas were powerful in forming attitudes
and beliefs,69 and likened it to political speech, which merits the
highest protection of the First Amendment. 7o The court found
Pornography sexualizes rape, battery, sexual harassment, prostitution, and child sexual
abuse ... [Ilt eroticizes the dominance and submission that is the dynamic common to
them all." [d. at 17.
64. When a work has socially redeeming artistic or literary value, the obscene aspects may not be banned. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20. Following this reasoning, the Hudnut
court criticizes the Indianapolis ordinance for targeting particular depictions in the work,
not to the work judged as a whole, which the Miller definition requires. Hudnut, 771
F.2d at 325.
65. See supra note 25 and accompanying text for an explanation of Miller's artistic
defense for works with redeeming scientific, political or literary value.
66. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
67. See INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CITy-COUNTY GENERAL ORDINANCE ch. 16, § 16-3(q)(1984).
68. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329 (explaining that pornography expresses powerful ideas,
the court stated, "Pornography affects how people see the world, their fellows, and social
relations."). In contrast to Barnes, the Hudnut court concluded that the ordinance regulated speech rather than the conduct involved in making pornography. The court intimated that the regulation of speech could be justified only by a compelling interest in
reducing sex discrimination, which the court found that Indianapolis had not established. [d. at 326. Compare Hudnut with Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458, where the Court
held the state had established a compelling interest in avoiding secondary harms from
nude dancing establishments from the legislative history, although the statute did not
explicitly set forth such an interest.
69. In answering the anti-pornographers' position that pornography perpetuates
harm to women, the court reasoned that this was evidence of the pornographic materials'
power as speech. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
70. The Hudnut court likened pornographic speech to other highly controversial
ideological and political speech, such as Communism and Marxism, pointing out that
when speech is controversial, it merits even higher protection:
If pornography is what pornography does, so is other speech .
. Hitler's orations affected how some Germans saw Jews. Communism is a world view, not simply a Manifesto by Marx and
Engels or a set of speeches. Efforts to suppress communist
speech in the United States were based on the belief that the
public acceptability of such ideas would increase the likelihood of totalitarian government . . . . Yet all is protected
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that the drafters of the ordinance were trying to regulate speech
on the basis of content.71 This rendered the ordinance viewpoint-based legislation which the court held unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. 72

C. American Booksellers Ass'n u. Hudnut:

THE AMERICAN OBSCENITY DEFINITION'S INABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE THE HARM
FROM PORNOGRAPHY

The extreme differences in the results of Barnes and Hudnut illustrate the inconsistent application of the American obscenity definition. The Hudnut decision exemplifies the difficulties the rigid constraints the obscenity doctrine presents to
courts in trying to deal with pornography's harmful effects. 73
The anti-pornography feminists describe three categories of
harms generated by the pornography industry: 1) exploitation of
those participating in the production of pornography,'" 2) encouragement of sex crimes which would not have otherwise been
committed by the audiences of pornography,7Ii and 3) discrimination fostered by pornography's social conditioning. 76
In Hudnut, the Seventh Circuit was confronted with extensive empirical evidence by proponents of the anti-pornography
ordinance of pervasive physical, mental, and behavioral harms.77
speech, however insidious.
Id. at 329-30.
71. Id. at 325.
72. Id. at 330. The court found that the material presented an idea, no matter how
controversial, and as such, should be afforded constitutional protection.
73. For further discussion on the constraints of the American obscenity doctrine, see
Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329; TRIBE, supra note 4, § 12-16; Karo & McBrian, supra note 10,
at 181; MacKinnon, supra note 29, at 329-40.
74. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 595.
75.Id.
76. Id. For a comprehensive list of various psychological reports and recent statistical studies regarding the harms generated by pornography, see generally MACKINNON,
supra note 5, at 304 n.6.
77. See Andrea Dworkin, Pornography is a Civil Rights Issue For Women, 21 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 55 (1986). The article is a transcript of Dworkin's testimony before the
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, during its hearings at the United
States Court of International Trade in New York City, Jan. 22, 1986. Dworkin presents
an in-depth and highly emotional discussion of the harms the Indianapolis ordinance was.
trying to target. She first speaks about the exploitation of women in the industry, how
most come from poor backgrounds where they have not had opportunities in society. Id.
at 56. They are raped, maimed, abused, and tortured in pornography. Id. at 55-57. Por-
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The proposed ordinance did not aim to prohibit pornography
because of its sexual explicitness. Rather, the ordinance targeted
the degrading and subordinate depictions of women in pornography and the injury women suffer from these portrayals. 78
The Hudnut court acknowledged that pornography harms
women, stating: "Therefore we accept the premises of this legislation. Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate status of women in turn leads to affront
and lower pay at work, insult and injury at home, battery and
rape on the streets."79 Such acknowledgement was the furthest
limit of the Hudnut court's ability to address such harm, however. 80 The court immediately went on to hold that these "unhappy effects ... simply demonstrate[] the power of pornography as speech. "81 The court stated that the power of expression
in pornography is what requires the protection of the First
Amendment. 82 Thus, the Hudnut holding demonstrates how degrading pornography which falls outside the obscenity definition
will not be recognized as harmful under the American approach.
nography also creates the atmosphere for sexual harassment in jobs, in education and on
the streets. Id. at 57. It encourages men to sexually assault women, to treat them as
objects and to humiliate them. Id. at 56. She further explains that the harm to women by
pornography is invisible because most sexual abuse still occurs in private, even though
there is photographic documentation of it, called the pornography industry. Id. at 60.
78. See INDIANAPOLIS. IND. CITy-COUNTY GENERAL ORDINANCE ch. 16, § 16-3(q)
(1984).
79. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
80. Id. at 326. The court appears to have ignored the legislative history of'the ordinance, which addresses the lowered social status and abuse women face from the degrading pornographic depictions in certain materials, holding that "[t]he regulation of speech
could be justified, the [trial] court thought, only by a compelling interest in reducing sex
discrimination, an interest that Indianapolis had not established." Id. See also MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 20. Professor MacKinnon argues that the evidence of harm before
the legislature is given no weight at all. Professor MacKinnon also scathingly indicts the
court for taking the "blame-the-victim-misogyny" view that, "[aJdult women generally
have the capacity to protect themselves from participating in and being personally victimized by pornography." Id. (quoting American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 11 Media
L. Rep. 1105, 1119 (S.D. Ind. 1984)). Compare Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 3326, with Barnes,
111 S. Ct. at 2461, where the Supreme Court inferred a compelling interest in preserving
the morals of a community absent any legislative history on the fact: "It is impossible to
discern, other than from the text of the statute, exactly what governmental interest the
Indiana legislators had in mind when they enacted this statute. . . . Nonetheless, the
statute's purpose of protecting societal order and morality is clear . . . . " Barnes at
2461.
81. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329. Compare id. at 329 with Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458
(allowing regulation of the harmful secondary effects of nudity in dancing).
82. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
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D.. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECOGNITION OF OTHER HARMS AS A
BASIS FOR REGULA.TING SPEECH

Unlike obscenity, where offensiveness is the only "harm"
recognized, other categories of speech are regulated on the basis
of avoiding antisocial behavior and attitudinal harms.ss Child
pornography, group libel, fighting words, and the location of
adult theaters are all regulated on the basis of the potential
harms they may cause.
1.

Child Pornography - New York u. Ferbers4

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized a strong
state interest in avoiding harm to children. sli In New York u.
Ferber, the Court examined the constitutionality of a New York
criminal statute which prohibited knowing distribution and promotion of sexual performances by children under the age of 16. s8
The Ferber court departed from the strict Miller test and allowed states greater latitude in regulation of pornography where
the well-being of children was involved. 87 The Court reasoned
that, "the use of children as ... subject[s]of pornographic
materials is· very harmful to both the children and the society as
a whole. "88 The Court permitted states to enact legislation which
did not incorporate an artistic defense, reasoning that the state
83. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding zoning
laws which disperse adult theaters because of harmful secondary effects); Young, 427
U.S. at 50 (upholding zoning of adult theatres because of harmful effects).
84. 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a New York criminal statute prohibiting the dis·
tribution of child pornography).
85. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747. For other cases which involve children and obscene or
indecent materials, see Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 739·41 (permitting government to
restrict the broadcasting of non-obscene offensive language, in part because of danger to
children); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973) (stressing the special problems
of keeping obscene printed material from being distributed to children); Paris Adult
Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 58 n.7 (1973) (noting that because books are portable and durable,
simply banning children from adult movie houses does not adequately protect juveniles).
See also Miller, 413 U.S. at 27 (permitting government to restrict dissemination of ob·
scene materials because of the danger of exposure to juveniles).
86. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747.
87. See id. at 753.
88. S. REP. No. 95·438, at 5 (1977), quoted in Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 n.9. These
words echo the analysis in Miller, which recognized that states have a legitimate interest
in prohibiting dissemination of obscene material when the dissemination has a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to minors.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 775.
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had a compelling interest in forbidding sexual acts involving minors.89 Ferber shows the Court's willingness to restrict speech in
order to safeguard children's emotional and physical well-being.
2.

Clear and Present
Hampshire 90

Danger

Chaplinsky

v.

New

The Supreme Court is also willing to restrict speech, regardless of its political or ideological value, when the speech presents
danger of an "imminent breach of the peace."91 In Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting
words "tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the
peace . . . ."92 The Court reiterated "that Freedom of
Speech ... [is] among the fundamental personal rights and
liberties which are protected ... [against] state action."93 The
Court held, however, that prohibition of certain classes of speech
presents no constitutional problem because their very utterance
inflicts injury.94
3.

Group Libel - Beauharnais v. Illinois 95

Group libel is a category where the American courts have
restricted speech on the basis of harm without a showing of clear
and present danger. 96 In Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court upheld a statute prohibiting the sale or advertising of
materials which "portray[] depravity, criminality, unchastity, or
lack of virtue, of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or
religion."97 The Court recognized that the State of Illinois could
89. [d. at 761. The Court asserted that "the Miller standard, like all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the State's particular and more
compelling interest [in protecting children] .... " [d.
90. 315 U.S. 572 (1942) (upholding a statute prohibiting speech which tends to incite a breach of the peace).
91. [d. at 572.
92. [d. at 573.
93. [d. at 570-71.
94. [d. at 571-72.
95. 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding a statute prohibiting the sale of materials which
denigrate a certain class of citizens).
96. [d. at 250. Although the vitality of Beauharnais has been brought into question,
the United States Supreme Court continues to rely on it. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (striking down a St. Paul ordinance prohibiting the display
of a burning cross); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763.
97. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251.
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legitimately address the harm in group libel without a showing
of clear and present danger. 9s
The Illinois statute sought to address tensions between
races which often escalated into violence and destruction. 99 As a
result, the Beauharnais Court held that the state could rationally infer that the racist utterances in question played a significant part in such violence. loo Even though there was less than
conclusive empirical evidence that racist utterances incited violence,lol the Court allowed restriction of such utterances in the
interest of avoiding societal harm. l02

4. Zoning
The Supreme Court frequently employs "reasonable time,
place, and manner" restrictions to regulate the harmful effects
of pornography. loa Here, the Court recognizes that pornographic
theaters cause substantial harm to property values because of
their tendency to attract criminal elements i~to neighborhoods.
The adult theaters may. thus be regulated in order to minimize
that damage. l04 The "harmful" secondary effects of permitting
pornography to flourish in neighborhoods give state legislatures
ample justification to enact stringent zoning laws to restrict such
activity. 1011
98. Id. at 266.
99. Id. at 259.
100. Id.
101. The Beauharnais Court relied on various commission reports and instances
within their own community to support the notion of harm caused by the racist utterances.Id.
102. See R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541-46. The Court's decision again brings into question the vitality of Beauharnais. The Court seems to be moving away from allowing
regulation of speech on the basis of non-imminent harm to a group. Justice Scalia's opinion appears to be retreating back into the categorical approach which only allows regulation in certain narrow classes of speech which do not have "traditional First Amendment'
values" and therefore no expressive value. Note, however, that Justice Stevens' concurrence reminds the Court that the focus of speech regulation should be on the harm
speech causes. Id. at 2569-70 (Stevens, J., concurring).
103. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 41; Young, 427 U.S. at 50.
104. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 ("The ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent
crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values ... not to suppress the
expression of unpopular views.").
105. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34 ("[AJ concentration of 'adult' movie theaters
causes the 'area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters showing other types of films. It is this secondary effect which these
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In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc./o s the Supreme Court
upheld an ordinance which intended to prevent harmful secondary effects of pornography by geographically dispersing adult
theaters.107 The Court concluded that the Renton ordinance was
content-neutral because it was not aimed at the substantive
message of the obscene movies, but at the secondary effects
these movies had on crime rates, neighborhood quality and
property value. 108 Ostensibly, the Court did not advocate a complete ban on adult establishment!;l.109
The Court's willingness to uphold zoning ordinances which
greatly restrict access to pornographic establishments highlights
the Court's awareness of some of the harms the pornography industry generates. no The Court's remedy for pornographic harms,
however, is to place the pornography out of sight or disperse it
zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of 'offensive' speech.");
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he State's interest in preventing
the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments - prostitution, sexual assaults, and other criminal activity - is sufficient ... to justify the law's enforcement
against nude dancing."). Compare Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458, with Butler, [1992] 1
S.C.R. at 507. The Butler court rejects the use of reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions since the harm remains the same and is simply shifted to other areas under
such restrictions:
Once it has been established that the objective is the avoidance of harm ... it is untenable to argue that these harms
could be avoided by placing restrictions on access to such material. Making the materials more difficult to obtain by increasing their cost and reducing their availability does not
achieve [the avoidance of harm]. Once Parliament has reasonably concluded that certain acts are harmful to certain groups
in society and to society in general, it would be inconsistent, if
not hypocritical, to argue that such acts could be committed in
more restrictive conditions. The harm sought to be avoided
would remain the same in either case.
[d. at 507-08.
106. 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding an ordinance which dispersed adult theaters because of harmful secondary effects on neighborhoods around the theaters).
107. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51. The Renton Court recognized that adult theaters and
the movies shown in them increase crime in neighborhoods. The ordinance mandated
that adult establishments be more than one thousand feet away from the nearest residential neighborhoods.
108. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 612.
109. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46. The Court reasoned that as long as there are alternative avenues of communication, free speech has not been abrogated. The ordinance does
not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely provides that such theaters may not be
located within 1000 feet of any residential zone.
110. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 612-13.
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in "non-residential" neighborhoods. l l l This fails to recognize
that the fundamental harm from pornography remains the same,
whether in wealthy or poor neighborhoods, whether there is one
or a dozen adult theaters.ll2
III.

RECOGNIZING HARM TO WOMEN FROM
PORNOGRAPHY AS A BASIS FOR REGULATION

The United States Supreme Court recognizes harm in its
decisions dealing with child pornography, fighting words, group
libel and zoning ordinances. In all of these areas, the Supreme
Court balances the value of the speech with the compelling interest of avoiding harm.1l3 This is not the case with pornography, however. The Supreme Court's resistance to extending such
an approach to pornography, and insistence on using the obscenity definition as a standard, is symptomatic of the Court's refusal to recognize pornography for what it clearly is - expression. 114 The effect of the Supreme Court's categorical approach
is to make the laws dealing with pornography, as the Miller
Court recognized, "a hodge-podge."l1li
The Supreme Court never recognizes the expressive value of
depictions of sex. As a result, courts cannot legitimize concerns
of women harmed by pornography.116 In contrast to the American approach, the recent Canadian Supreme Court decision of
R. v. Butler applies a harms-based analysis to pornography
while recognizing the expressive value of all forms of sex.
111. See Dworkin, supra note 77, at 59. The author criticizes zoning ordinances as
ineffective for dealing with the harmful effects of pornographic establishments:
Zoning laws impose pornography on poor neighborhoods, on
working-class neighborhoods, on neighborhoods where people
of color live, and all of those people have to deal with the increase of crime, the terrible harassment, the degradation of
the quality of life in their neighborhoods, and the politicians
get to protect the property values of the rich.
112. See Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 507 (discussing the hypocritical nature of zoning
which merely relocates the problem, yet leaves the harms intact).
113. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 602-03.
114. See TRIBE, supra note 4, § 12-16; Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law,
92 COLUM. L. REV. I, 18 (1992) ("Obscenity does not count as speech; the Supreme Court
treats it as sex rather than expression.").
115. Miller, 413 U.S. at 43.
116. See discussion supra note 77 on the harms the Hudnut court failed to
recognize.
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On February 27, 1992, the Canadian Supreme Court unanimously upheld a criminal obscenity statute prohibiting "undue
exploitation of sex" in pornographic materials.1l7 The Canadian
criminal obscenity statute defines obscenity as: "[A]ny publication a dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and anyone or more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty or violence, shall be deemed
to be obscene. "118
The Butler analysis employs a "community standards" test
to determine what material falls in this category.1I9 While the
American Miller community standards test targets what is "offensive" to the community, the Butler analysis targets "harm"
which the community is not willing to tolerate. 12o The court held
that "the community standards test is concerned not with what
Canadians would not tolerate themselves being exposed to, but
what they would not tolerate other Canadians being exposed
to."121
The Butler court held that the statute in question violated
Canada's freedom of expression clause.122 However, the limitations the statute imposed on pornography were reasonably justified under Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, which guarantees
"the rights and freedoms set out in [the Canadian freedom of
expression clause] subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstratively justified in a free and
117. Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46 § 163(8) (1985) (Can.). See also Mahoney,
supra note 13, at 78.
118. R.S.C. ch. C-46 § 163(8) (1985) (Can.) (emphasis added).
119. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 485. Harm in this context means that "it predisposes
persons to act in an anti-social manner .... Anti-social conduct for this purpose is conduct which society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper functioning." [d.
120. Basing a community standards test on "harm" leads to a more uniform approach to what society will consider intolerable. Offensiveness is a more subjective and
abstract concept which will fluctuate depending on different contexts. Notions of harm
are far more concrete and less susceptible to individual interpretations.
121. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 478.
122. CAN. CONST: (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 2(b): "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: ... freedom of
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media
of communication." This provision is substantially similar to the first amendment in the
United States.
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democratic society."123 The Butler court held that the statute's
regulation of certain pornographic materials was constitutionally
permissible under Canadian law in the interest of avoiding harm
and promoting equality.124
1.

Facts and Procedural History

In Butler, the government seized pornographic materials
from a video, magazine and sexual paraphernalia ShOp.1211 The
owner was charged with several counts of selling obscene material, possessing obscene material for distribution or sale, and exposing obscene material to public view in contravention of Sec.tion 163 of the Criminal Code. 126
The trial court acquitted the owner of most of the charges,
on the grounds that the freedom of expression clause in Section
2(b) of the Canadian Charter protected the seized materials.127
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and entered convictions on all counts, holding that the seized materials
fell outside the protection of the Charter.128 The defendant then
appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court.129
2. Butler's Recognition of Pornography as Expression

First, Butler determined that pornographic material is ex123. CAN. CONST. pt. 1, § 1. In contrast to the United States Constitution, Section 1
specifically allows for limitations on freedom of expression in the interest of furthering a
free and democratic society, such as equality.
124. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 509. See also Mahoney, supra note 13, at 103.
125. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 461.
126. [d. Section 163 reads:
(1) Everyone commits an offence who
(a) makes, prints, publishes, distributes, circulates, or has in
his possession for the purpose of publication, distribution or
circulation any obscene written matter, picture, model, phonograph record or other thing whatever ....
(8) For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant
characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of
sex and anyone or more of the following subjects, namely,
crime, horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be
obscene.
[d. at 469.
127. [d. at 461. See also Mahoney, supra note 13, at 79.
128. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 462.
129. [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/7

20

Juson and Lillington: R. v. Butler

R. v. BUTLER

1993]

671

pressive and thus merits protection under the Canadian Constitution's freedom of expression clause. ISO The Canadian Supreme
Court rejected the appellate court's holding that the depiction of
purely physical activity had no expressive content.1a1 The Supreme Court asserted:
[I]n creating a film, regardless of its content, the
maker of the film is consciously choosing the particular images which together constitute the film.
In choosing his or her images, the creator of the
film is attempting to convey some meaning. The
meaning to be ascribed to the work cannot be
measured by the reaction of the audience, which
in some cases, may amount to no more than physical arousal or shock. 132

Butler concluded that videos, magazines, and other sexual
gadgets convey meaning and fall within the ambit of expression. 1s3 Because Section 163 of the Criminal Code specifically
sought to restrict certain types of expressive activity, the Canadian Supreme Court held that the Code infringed upon freedom
of expression. 134
The Canadian Charter's equality clause specifically permits
a certain amount of restriction on freedom of speech.135 Such restriction is permissible because Section 15 of the Canadian
Charter firmly recognizes everyone's right to equality as a paramount constitutional provision. 136 Specifically, Section 15 provides that: "Every individual is equal before and under the law
and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the
law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimi130. Id. at 489. Because Section 163(8) of the Criminal Code sought to restrict material which communicates "undue exploitation of sex," the Section clearly infringed the
freedom of expression clause of the Canadian Charter.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 489-90.
133. Id. at 488.
134. Id. at 489.
135. CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 15(1).
136. See Kathleen Mahoney, R. v. Keegstra, 37 MCGILL L.J. 242, 243 (1992). Compare CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 15(1) with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, which states: "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
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nation based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability."137
This Section allows the Canadian courts to freely address
the harms perpetuated by pornography while acknowledging its
expressive value. 188 Because of this, Butler balances the expressive value of explicit material against other interests. 13s

3. Butler's Recognition of the Harms Implicit in Pornography
Butler next considered whether the objectives of Section
163 justified restricting the expression in pornographic material
on the basis of its harm.lolo Here, the court held that the aim of
Section 163 was the avoidance of harm to society posed by undue exploitation of sex. l4l Unlike the American view, Butler widened the focus from simply viewing pornographic material as
corrupting public morals. 142 Butler also focused on the sociological, political, and psychological effects from pornography in its
analysis. 1ol3
Butler defined harm in this context as "predispos[ing] persons to act in an antisocial manner as, for example, the physical
or mental mistreatment of women by men."l"" Specifically, the
degrading depiction of women in pornography and the negative
perceptions and attitudes resulting from such depictions falls
within the Butler definition of harm.1ol11 This directly contrasts
the United States Supreme Court's view that pornography's
137. CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 15(1).
138. See Mahoney, supra note 13, at 79.
139. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 511.
140. Id. at 489.
141. Id. at 492. The court found that the statute's objectives were not aimed at
restricting public and sexual morality solely because it reflected the conventions of a
given community.
142. Id. at 492-93. Butler rejects a notion of legal moralism, noting that "[tJhe prevention of 'dirt for dirt's sake' is not a legitimate objective which would justify the violation of one of the most fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Charter." Id.
143. Butler uses Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, which guarantees equality, to
alleviate some of the harms of sexual discrimination by regulating pornography. Id. at
511. See also MACKINNON, supra Mte 5, at 195-214 (also following the view that regulation of pornography is valid to redress the inequality women face); Mahoney, supra note
136, at 268.
144. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 485.
145. Id. at 504.
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harm is its offensiveness. 146

Butler examines pornography's tendency to incite violence
such as rape and battery towards women. 147 The court also explored the more insidious types of harm pornography generates,
including changing attitudinal beliefs regarding acceptable levels
of violence against women in society.H8 Butler's approach is in
accord with the position set forth by Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin and other anti-pornography feminists in the
United States. H9
The Butler court articulates several of the well-established
United States anti-pornographers' arguments in its balancing
test of harms versus free speech considerations.lIIO Butler's analysis implicitly adopts the three categories of gender-related
harms articulated by the anti-pornography feminists. m

Butler cited with approval the specific harms articulated by
the Report on Pornography by the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. m -The Report provides:
The clear and unquestionable danger of this type
of material is that it reinforces some unhealthy
tendencies in Canadian society. The effect of this
type of material is to reinforce male-female stereotypes to the detriment of both sexes. It at146. See discussion supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text on the morality-based
American obscenity doctrine.
147. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 507-08.
148. [d. at 496-97. It is unclear whether Butler's willingness to recognize harms
would extend as far as the types of harms recognized by radical feminists in the United
States. Note Professor MacKinnon's very liberal view of what constitutes sexual assault:
The figure [of sexual assault] includes all the forms of rape or
other sexual abuse or harassment surveyed, non-contact as
well as contact, from gang-rape by strangers to obscene phone
calls, unwanted sexual advances on the street, unwelcome requests to pose for pornography, and subjection to 'Peeping
Toms' and sexual exhibitionists.
MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 16 n.31.
149. See MacKinnon, supra note 5, at 56-60 (discussing the silencing of women
through subordinate depictions in pornography); Mahoney, supra note 13, at 84-89
(describing various views on harm from types of speech); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 594602 (discussing harm in 'pornography as a basis of regulation).
150. Butler, [1992) 1 S.C.R. at 493-94.
151. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 508. See also Sunstein, supra note 10, at 595; supra
notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
152. Butler, [1992) 1 S.C.R. at 493-94.
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tempts to make degradation, humiliation, victimization, and violence in human relationships
appear normal and acceptable. A society which
hQlds that egalitarianism, non-violence, consensualism, and mutuality are basic to any human interaction, whether sexual or other, is clearly justified in controlling and prohibiting any medium of
depiction, description or advocacy which violates
these principles. 1&8
Following the Report's findings, the court found that certain
themes in pornographic material were harmful because they had
a detrimental impact on individuals exposed to them and consequently on society as a whole. 1114
The Butler court concluded that avoidance of harm against
women and children constituted a legitimate objective of the
statute. 11i1i The court held that such harm was sufficiently pressing and substantial to restrict freedom of expression. 1116

IV. BUTLER'S BALANCE OF HARMS: PORNOGRAPHY
vs. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Finally, Butler balanced the interest in avoiding harm to
women against freed('.,.,-:n of expression. 11i7 The court found that
the anti-pornography statute provided a rational and proportional means to further the interest of avoiding societal harm
153. CAN. HOUSE COMM. STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND LEGAL AFFAIRS. REPORT ON PORNOGRAPHY, Issue No. 18, (1978), cited with approval in Butler, [1992] 1
S.C.R. at 493-94.
154. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 500. The court made the distinction between harmful
pornography and "good" pornography. The objective of the criminal statute was not to
inhibit the celebration of human sexuality. Such "good" pornography has value because
it "validates women's will to pleasure. It celebrates female nature. It validates a range of
female sexuality that is wider and truer than that legitimated by the non-pornographic
culture. Pornography when it is good celebrates both female pleasure and male rationality." Id. (citing Robin West, The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance
and the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography Report, 4 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 681, 696 (1987)).
155. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 507 ("[T]he objective is the avoidance of harm
caused by the degradation which many women feel as 'victims' of the message of obscenity, and of the negative impact exposure to such material has on perceptions and attitudes towards women .... ").
156. Id. at 498.
157. Id. at 499.
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without unduly burdening freedom of expression. 1Ii8
The Canadian Supreme Court held that prohibition of pornographic materials which cause harm minimally impairs freedom of expression. 1Ii9 Since the statute prohibited only sexually
explicit pornography which was "violent or degrading," the provision was valid for two reasons. 160 First, the provision left untouched materials which had artistic or literary value. 16l Secondly, the statute targeted only, public distribution rather than
private possession.1 62 Therefore, the restrictions on violent and
degrading pornography were easier to justify. 163

Butler also found that the Canadian legislature had no alternate and less intrusive measures to accomplish the objectives
of avoiding harm to women and society.164 The court rejected
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions as "inconsistent
and hypocritical" because such restrictions did not alter the fundamental harmful effects of the pornographic material. 161i Consequently, the court held the harm sought to be avoided would
remain the same. 166

v.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF BUTLER FOR THE UNITED
STATES
Opponents of anti-pornography legislation argue that cen-

158. To be consistent with the Charter, the restrictions imposed by a statute must
be rationally connected and proportional to the legislative objective" This includes an
inquiry into whether there exists: 1) a rational connection between the impugned measures and the objective, 2) minimal impairment of the right or freedom, and 3) a proper
balance between the effects of the limiting measures and the legislative objective. [d,
159. [d, at 505.
160. [d,
161. [d.
162. [d. at 501. The Butler court also found pornographic material did not stand on
equal footing with other speech because it was motivated by economic profit. [d, See also
Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 Nw, U. L, REV, 555 (1989) (presenting
an overview of the different categories of high and low value speech).
163. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 503.
164, [d, at 507-09. The court acknowledged education and other measures as means
to address the problem of pornography. However, the court found these measures were
responses to the harm from pornography and did not control the dissemination of the
images that contribute to subordinating attitudes. Thus, the means did not control the
cause of the problem, merely the effects.
165. [d. at 507.
166. [d,
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sorship of pornography would start American courts down a
slippery slope where critical political speech would soon be censored. 167 This concern appears unmerited, given the willingness
of the Supreme Court to regulate areas of speech where "serious" harms are at stake, such as harm to children from pornography or secondary effects of zoning. 166 More importantly, this
concern obfuscates the underlying trivialization of pornographic
harms implicit in the American courts' refusal to depart from
the traditional obscenity definition and its outdated categorical
approach.
It is unclear how the American treatment of obscenity as
non-expression helps keep political speech unfettered. 169 Instead, labelling obscene material as "unprotected" merely masks
the true issues and disempowers American courts from directly
tackling concerns about the effects of pornography.l7O Pornography labelled as "obscenity" cannot be non-expressive when it
deals with one of the most intimate, emotional and highly
charged of human activities. l7l The intensity surrounding the
pornography debate testifies to pornography's expressive
power. 172

Using a Butler-type analysis in the United States would allow the courts to deal honestly with the issue of pornography
and its effects while recognizing its value as expression. American courts could legitimize the harm behind pornographic expression while accommodating First Amendment concerns
through a balancing test which Butler provides. Butler breaks
away from the rigid categorization of obscenity versus speech
and widens the judicial perspective to encompass other issues.
In Hudnut, a Butler-type analysis would not have trivialized the importance of pornography's harm to women in balancing First Amendment concerns.178 The Butler analysis would
167. For an in-depth discussion on why pornography restrictions are not leading the
United States down a "slippery slope," see Karo & McBrian, supra note 10, at 203-05.
168. See discussion supra part II.D on the United States Supreme Court's recognition of other types of harm.
169. See Karo & McBrian, supra note 10, at 203.
170. See MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 3.
171. See Bowers, 458 U.s. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329; MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 17.
173. See discussion supra part III.A.3 regarding Butler's harm analysis.
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have addressed sex discrimination and other tangible harms
from pornography. Like the American approach, however, the
Butler analysis also would have recognized that the stringent Indianapolis ordinance was an impermissible infringement on expression because of its refusal to recognize the artistic value in
pornographic materials. The Butler analysis shows that the First
Amendment concerns can be accomodated while treating serious
problems perpetuated by pornography.
A Butler analysis would have reached the same result in
Hudnut, but would have left the door open for other anti-pornography ordinances based on a harms-equality approach to
succeed. Women's victimization due to pornography would have
been validated as harms that society needs to protect against,
instead of being dismissed as "unhappy effects" which are necessary to the marketplace of ideas.

Butler's willingness to recognize pornography as expression,
would have rendered a very different result in Barnes. 174 Under
the Butler analysis, American courts would not have to separate
the nudity from erotic dancing. 17II A Butler approach would allow courts to acknowledge the expressive value of the dancing in
its totality.176 By acknowledging this expressive value, Butler
can look at the effects of nude dancing on the community as a
whole. Butler would not restrict courts to analyzing "secondary
effects" in neighborhoods. Butler would allow courts to consider
the subtle pervasive harms generated by women stripping in
front of men in bars, not simply whether the nudity of the dance
affronts a public sense of decency. A Butler analysis would provide a more complete and realistic approach to the regulation of
nude dancing.

174. Contra Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462 (distinguishing between non-expressive
nudity and expressive dancing).
175. Id.
176. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 487 (stating that although the subject matter may
depict only physical activity, the subject matter may conveyor attempt to convey ideas
through such activity).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Butler's recognition of pornography as expression is an invigorating change from the United States Supreme Court's dogmatic decency-based Miller standard with its cloudy underlying
rationales. The Miller obscenity definition does not accomodate
expressive value in sexually explicit materials which are offensive, but protects violent and misogynist pornography because of
the "powerful" ideology it conveys.I77
A recognition of pornography as expression currently allows
Canadian courts to consider its harmful effects. Only when pornography is considered expression can the harm such expression
perpetuates be recognized.
In Butler, the court balanced concerns for freedom of expression against harm caused by pornographic expression. I78 The
First Amendment in this country may cause the Supreme Court
to weigh these interests somewhat differently than the Butler
Court. However, a Butler approach still fits into the American
constitutional framework, albeit different in scope.
Ostensibly, a Butler approach in the United States seems to
render similar results as those reached through the obscenity
doctrine, yet it provides courts with a clearer set of guidelines
for dealing with the issue of pornography. A Butler approach
would also render those results through an analysis which acknowledges harms instead of trying to hide them away.

Justine Juson & Brenda Lillington *

177. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329.
178. See discussion supra part IV.
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